In this paper we put forward the Bounded Player Model for secure computation. In this new model, the number of players that will ever be involved in secure computations is bounded, but the number of computations has no a-priori bound. Indeed, while the number of devices and people on this planet can be realistically estimated and bounded, the number of computations these devices will run can not be realistically bounded. We stress that in the Bounded Player model, in addition to no apriori bound on the number of sessions, there is no synchronization barrier, no trusted party, and simulation must be performed in polynomial time.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge proofs, introduced in the seminal work of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] , are a fundamental building block in cryptography. Loosely speaking, a zero-knowledge proof is an interactive proof between two parties -a prover and a verifier -with the seemingly magical property that the verifier does not learn anything beyond the validity of the statement being proved. Subsequent to their introduction, zero-knowledge proofs have been the subject of a great deal of research (see, for example, [BSMP91, DDN91, Ost91, OW93, DNS98, CGGM00, Bar01, IKOS09]), and have found numerous applications in cryptography (e.g., [GMW87, FFS88] ).
Concurrent zero knowledge.
The original definition of zero knowledge, although very fundamental and useful to cryptography, is only relevant to the "stand-alone" setting where security holds only if the protocol runs in isolation. As such, it does not suffice if one wishes to run a zero-knowledge proof over a modern network environment, such as the Internet. Towards that end, Dwork, Naor and Sahai [DNS98] initiated the study of concurrent zero-knowledge (cZK) proofs that remain secure even if several instances of the protocol are executed concurrently under the control of an adversarial verifier. Subsequent to their work, cZK has been the subject of extensive research, with a large body of work devoted to studying its round-complexity. In the standard model, the round-complexity of cZK was improved from polynomial to slightly super-logarithmic in a sequence of works [RK99, KP01, PRS02] . In particular, theÕ(log k)-round construction of [PRS02] nearly matches the lower bound ofΩ(log k) w.r.t. black-box simulation [CKPR01] (see also [KPR98, Ros00] ).
Despite a decade of research, theÕ(log k)-round construction of [PRS02] is still the most roundefficient cZK protocol known. Indeed, the lower bound of [CKPR01] suggests that a breakthrough in non-black-box simulation techniques is required to achieve cZK with sub-logarithmic round complexity. 1
Round-efficient cZK in relaxations of the standard model. While the round-complexity of cZK in the standard model still remains an intriguing open question, a long line of work has been dedicated towards constructing round-efficient cZK in various relaxations of the standard model. Notable mentions include the super-polynomial time simulation (SPS) model [Pas03] , timing model [DNS98] , various setup models (such as common reference string [BSMP91] , etc.), the boundedconcurrency model [Bar01] , and preprocessing models [CO99, CGGM00] . Below, we briefly discuss the state of the art on these models.
Constant-round cZK and more. In the SPS model [Pas03] , the zero-knowledge simulator is allowed to run in super-polynomial time, as opposed to running in polynomial time (as per the standard definition of [GMR85] ). Indeed, this relaxation has yielded not only constant-round cZK [Pas03] , but also concurrent-secure computation [LPV09, CLP10, GGJS12] . This stands in contrast to the standard model, where concurrent-secure computation is known to be impossible to achieve [Lin04, Lin03b, CKL03, CF01] . Similarly, in the timing model [DNS98] , where an upper-bound is assumed on the delivery time needed of a message (and therefore the adversary is assumed to have only limited control of the communication network), constant-round cZK is known [DNS98, Gol02, PTV10] , as well as is multi-party computation secure w.r.t. general concurrent composition [KLP05] . Another interesting relaxation of the standard model that has been previously studied is the bounded-concurrency model [Bar01] , where an apriori bound is assumed over the number of sessions that will ever take place (in particular, this bound is known to the protocol designer). Similar to the above models, one can not only realize constant-round bounded cZK [Bar01] , but also bounded-concurrent secure two-party and multi-party computation [Lin03a, PR03, Pas04] . Finally, note that similar results hold in popular models such as the common reference string [BSMP91, SCO + 01, CLOS02], key registration [BCNP04] , etc.
The fact that all these models yield concurrently secure multi-party computation (which is impossible to achieve in the standard model) gives evidence that they provide extremely powerful simulation techniques (that rely on specific properties of these models) that are not possible in the standard model. As such, one may argue that in retrospect, round-efficient constructions of cZK in these models may only be of limited interest towards a solution in the standard model.
Preprocessing models. The zero-knowledge pre-processing model was proposed in [KMO89] in a stand-alone setting and in [CO99] for cZK. In [CO99] , interaction is needed between all the involved players in a preprocessing phase. Then, after a synchronization-barrier is passed, the preprocessing is over and actual proofs start. Interactions in each phase can take place concurrently, but the two phases can not overlap in time. An improved model was later proposed in [CGGM00] where the preprocessing is required to be non-interactive, and the model is called "Bare Public-Key" (BPK) model, since the non-interactive messages played in the preprocessing can be considered as public announcements of public keys. In this model it is known how to obtain constant-round concurrent zero knowledge under standard assumptions [CV05, SV12] .
The crucial restriction of these preprocessing models is that all players who wish to ever participate in protocol executions must already play during the preprocessing phase, and new players cannot be added "on-the-fly" during the proof phase. The necessity of the synchronization barrier between the preprocessing phase and protocol computation phase severely limits the practical applicability of protocols in these models. However, all known round-efficient cZK protocols in the above preprocessing models clearly do not work if the synchronization barrier is removed. The same approach could be used to obtain a UC simulator but it has never been studied for the lack of interest on a relaxed notion of UC. Indeed UC critically relies on allowing the environment to interleave a given protocol with any other protocol. The preprocessing phase of the PP and BPK models in some sense would temporary disconnect players from the environment and this is against the spirit of UC. Interestingly, in [KL11] Kidron and Lindell proved that universally composable (UC) two-party computation is impossible to achieve in the BPK model without a synchronization barrier.
Our Question. While the above relaxations of the standard model discussed above have their individual appeal, each of these models suffers from various drawbacks, either w.r.t. the security guarantees provided (e.g., as in the case of the SPS model), or w.r.t. the actual degree of concurrency tolerated (e.g., as in the case of the timing model). Indeed, despite the extensive amount of research over the last decade, the round-complexity of cZK still remains open. In this work, we ask the question whether it is possible to construct cZK protocols with sub-logarithmic round-complexity in a natural model that does not suffer from the drawbacks of the previously studied models; namely, it does not require any preprocessing, assumes no trusted party or timing assumptions or an a-priori bound on the number of protocol sessions, and requires standard polynomial-time simulation and standard hardness complexity assumptions.
Our Results
In our work, we construct a concurrent (perfect) zero-knowledge argument system with sublogarithmic round-complexity in a mild relaxation of the standard model; we refer to this as the Bounded Player model. In this model we only assume that there is an apriori (polynomial) upperbound on the total number of players that may ever participate in protocol executions. We do not assume any synchronization barrier, or trusted party, and the simulation must be performed in polynomial time. In particular, we do not assume any apriori bound on the number of sessions, and achieve security under unbounded concurrency. As such, our model can be viewed as a strength-ening of the bounded-concurrency model. 2,3 Below, we give an informal statement of our main result.
Theorem 1 Assuming dense crypto systems and claw-free permutations, there exists an ω(1)-round concurrent perfect zero-knowledge argument system with concurrent soundness in the Bounded Player model.
Our security proof is (necessarily) non-black-box (see below), and the simulator of our protocol works in a "straight-line" manner. Our result is actually stronger since we only require a bound on the number of possible verifiers, while there is no restriction on the number of provers. We prove concurrent soundness since sequential and concurrent soundness are distinct notions in the Bounded Player model, precisely as shown by [MR01] for the BPK model.
We further show that the impossibility results of Lindell for concurrent-secure computation [Lin04] also hold in the Bounded Player model. This gives evidence that the Bounded Player model is much closer to the standard model than the previously studied models, and there is hope that generalizations of our techniques may be applicable to the standard model as well.
Our Techniques
Recall that in the Bounded Player model, the only assumption is that the total number of players that will ever be present in the system is apriori bounded. Then, an initial observation towards our goal of constructing sub-logarithmic round cZK protocols is that the black-box lower-bound of Canetti et al. [CKPR01] is applicable to our setting as well. Indeed, the impossibility result of [CKPR01] relies on an adversarial verifier that opens a polynomial number (k) of sessions and plays adaptively at any point of time, depending upon the transcript generated "so far". The same analysis works in the Bounded Player model, by assuming that the adversarial verifier registers a new key each time a new session is played. In particular, consider an adversarial verifier that schedules a session s i to be contained inside another session s j . In this case, a black-box simulator does not gain any advantage in the Bounded Player model over the standard model. The reason is that since the adversarial verifier of [CKPR01] behaves adaptively on the transcript at any point, after a rewind the same session will be played with a fresh new key, thus rendering essentially useless the fact that the session was already solved before. Note that this is the same problem that occurs in the standard model, and stands in contrast to what happens in the BPK model (where identities are fixed in the preprocessing and therefore do not change over rewinds).
From the above observation, it is clear that we must resort to non-black-box techniques. Now, a natural approach to leverage the bound on the number of players is to associate with each verifier V i a public key pk i and then design an FLS-style protocol [FLS90] that allows the ZK simulator to extract, in a non-black-box manner, the secret key sk i of the verifier and then use it as a "trapdoor" for "easy" simulation. The key intuition is that once the simulator extracts the secret key sk i of a verifier V i , it can perform easy simulation of all the sessions associated with V i . Then, since the total number of verifiers is bounded, the simulator will need to perform non-black-box extraction only an apriori bounded number of times (once for each verifier), which can be handled in a manner similar to the setting of bounded-concurrency [Bar01] . Unfortunately, the above intuition is misleading. In order to understand the problem with the above approach, let us first consider a candidate protocol more concretely. In fact, it suffices to focus on a preamble phase that enables non-black-box extraction (by the simulator) of a verifier's secret key since the remainder of the protocol can be constructed in a straightforward manner following the FLS approach. Now, consider the following candidate preamble phase (using the nonblack-box extraction technique of [BL02] ): first, the prover and verifier engage in a coin-tossing protocol where the prover proves "honest behavior" using a Barak-style non-black-box ZK protocol [Bar01] . Then, the verifier sends an encryption of its secret key under the public key P K that is determined from the output of the coin-tossing protocol.
In order to analyze this protocol, we will restrict our discussion to the simplified case where only one verifier is present in the system (but the total number of concurrent sessions are unbounded). At this point, one may immediately object that in the case of a single verifier identity, the problem is not interesting since the Bounded Player model is identical to the bare-public key model, where one can construct four-round cZK protocols using rewinding based techniques. However, simulation techniques involving rewinding do not "scale" well to the case of polynomially many identities (unless we use a large number of rounds) and fail 4 . Moreover the use of Barak's straight-line simulation technique is also insufficient since it works only when the number of concurrent sessions is bounded (even when there is a single identity), but instead our goal is to obtain unbounded concurrent zero knowledge. In contrast, our simulation approach is "straight-line" for an unbounded number of sessions and scales well to a large bounded number of identities. Therefore, in the forthcoming discussion, we will restrict our analysis to straight-line simulation. In this case, we find it instructive to focus on the case of a single identity to explain our key ideas.
We now turn to analyze the candidate protocol. Now, following the intuition described earlier, one may think that the simulator can simply cheat in the coin-tossing protocol in the "inner-most" session in order to extract the secret key, following which all the sessions can be simulated in a straight-line manner, without performing any additional non-black-box simulation. Consider, however, the following adversarial verifier strategy: the verifier schedules an unbounded number of sessions in such a manner that the coin-tossing protocols in all of these sessions are executed in a "nested" manner. Furthermore, the verifier sends the ciphertext (containing its secret key) in each session only after all the coin-tossing protocols across all sessions are completed. Note that in such a scenario, the simulator would be forced to perform non-black-box simulation in an unbounded number of sessions. Unfortunately, this is a non-trivial problem that we do not know how to solve it. More concretely, note that we cannot rely on techniques from the bounded-concurrency model since we cannot bound the total number of sessions (and thus, the total number of messages across all sessions). Further, all other natural approaches lead to a "blow-up" in the running time of the simulator. Indeed, if we were to solve this problem, then we would essentially construct a cZK protocol in the standard model, which remains an important open problem that we do not solve here.
In an effort to bypass the above problem, our first idea is to use multiple (ω(1), to be precise) preamble phases (instead of only one), such that the simulator is required to "cheat" in only one of these preambles. This, however, immediately raises a question: in which of the ω(1) preambles should the simulator cheat? This is a non-trivial question since if, for example, we let the simulator pick one of preambles uniformly at random, then with non-negligible probability, the simulator will end up choosing the first preamble phase. In this case, the adversary can simply perform the same attack as it did earlier playing only the first preamble phase, but for many different sessions so that the simulator will still have to cheat in many of them. Indeed, it would seem that any randomized oblivious simulation strategy can be attacked in a similar manner by simply identifying the first preamble phase where the simulator would cheat with a non-negligible probability.
Towards that end, our key idea is to use a specific probability distribution such that the simulator cheats in the first preamble phase with only negligible probability, while the probability of cheating in the later preambles increases gradually such that the "overall" probability of cheating is 1 (as required). Further, the distribution is such that the probability of cheating in the i th preamble is less than a fixed polynomial factor of the total probability of cheating in one of the previous i−1 blocks. Very roughly speaking, this allows us to prevent the adversary from attacking the first preamble where the simulator cheats with non-negligible probability. More specifically, for any session, let us call the preamble where the simulator cheats the "special" preamble. Further, let us say that the adversary "wins" a session if he "stops" that session in the special preamble before sending the ciphertext containing the verifier's secret key. Otherwise, the adversary "loses" that session. Then, by using the properties of our probability distribution, we are able to show that the adversary's probability of losing a session is more than the probability of winning. As a consequence, by careful choice of parameters, we are able to show that the probability of the adversary winning more than a polynomially bounded number of sessions without losing any sessions w.r.t. any given verifier is negligible. Once we obtain this fixed bound, we are then able to rely on techniques from the bounded-concurrency model [Bar01] to handle the bounded number of non-black-box simulations. For the sake of brevity, the above discussion is somewhat oversimplified. We refer the reader to the later sections for more details.
Extension to concurrent-secure computation -an impossibility Once we have a cZK protocol (as discussed above) in the Bounded Player model, it may seem that it should be possible to obtain concurrent-secure computation as well by using techniques from [Pas04] . Unfortunately, this turns out not to be the case, as we discuss below.
The key technical problem that arises in the setting of secure computation w.r.t. unbounded concurrency is the following. We cannot apriori bound the total number of "output delivery messages" (across all sessions) to the adversary; further, the session outputs cannot be "predicted" by the simulator before knowing the adversary's input. As such, known non-black-box simulation techniques cannot handle these unbounded number of messages and they inherently fail. 5 We remark that the same technical issue, in fact, arises in the standard model as well.
While the above argument only explains why known techniques fail, we can also obtain a formal impossibility result. Indeed, it is not difficult to see that the impossibility result of Lindell [Lin04] also holds for the Bounded Player model. (See Appendix C for details.)
Preliminaries and Definitions

Bounded Player Model
In this paper, we consider a new model of concurrent security, namely, the bounded player model, where we assume that there is an a-priori (polynomial) upper bound on the total number of player that will ever be present in the system. Specifically, let n denote the security parameter. Then, we will consider an upper bound N = poly(n) on the total number of players that can engage in concurrent executions of a protocol at any time. We assume that each player P i (i ∈ N ) has an associated unique identity id i , and that there is an established mechanism to enforce that party P i uses the same identity id i in each protocol execution that it participates in. We stress that such identities, do not have to be established in advance. New players can join the system with their own (new) identities, as long as the number of players does not exceed N .
We note that this requirement is somewhat similar in spirit to the bounded-concurrency model [Bar01, Lin03a, PR03, Pas04] , where it is assumed that the adversary cannot start more than an a-priori fixed number of concurrent executions of a protocol. We stress, however, that in our model, there is no a-priori bound on the total number of protocol sessions that may be executed concurrently. In this respect, one can view the Bounded Player model as a strengthening of the bounded-concurrency model. 6 Indeed, one can perhaps argue that bounding the number of computers in the world is a more realistic assumption than bounding the total number of protocols (that may be executed concurrently).
Implementing the Bounded Player model. We formalize the Bounded Player model by means of a functionality F N
bp that registers the identities of the player in the system. Specifically, a player P i that wishes to participate in protocol executions can, at any time, register an identity id i with the functionality F N bp . The registration functionality does not perform any checks on the identities that are registered, except that each party P i can register at most one identity id i , and that the total number of identity registrations are bounded by N . In other words, F N bp refuses to register any new identities once N number of identities have already been registered. The functionality F N bp is formally defined in Figure 1 .
In our constructions we will explicitly work in the setting where the identities of the parties are public keys of a semantically secure encryption scheme. (Actually, we will only require that the identities correspond to values in the range of a one-way function.) We note that in this particular case, the functionality F N bp bears much resemblance to the bulletin-board certificate authority functionality [KL11] , which suffices for obtaining authenticated channels [Can04] . We finally remark that our model is also closely related to the Bare Public-Key model, introduced by Canetti et al. [CGGM00] . However, we stress that unlike the Bare Public-Key model, we do not assume any synchronization barrier between the registration phase and the protocol computation phase. In particular, we allow parties to register their identities even after the computation begins.
Concurrent Zero Knowledge in Bounded Player Model
In this section, we formally define concurrent zero knowledge in the Bounded Player model. Our definition, given below, is an adaptation of the one of [PRS02] to the Bounded Player mode, by • Register commands: Upon receiving a message (register, sid, id i ) from some party P i , the functionality checks that no pair (P i , id i ) is already recorded and that count < N . If this is the case, it records the pair (P i , id i ) and sets count = count + 1. Other wise, it ignores the received message.
• Retrieve commands: Upon receiving a message (retrieve, sid, P i ) from some party P j or the adversary A, the functionality checks if some pair (P i , id i ) is recorded. If this the case, it sends (sid, also considering non-black-box simulation. Some of the text below is taken verbatim from [PRS02] . Let ppt denote probabilistic-polynomial time. Let P, V be an interactive argument for a language L. Consider a concurrent adversarial verifier V * that, given input x ∈ L, interacts with an unbounded number of independent copies of P (all on the same common input x and moreover equipped with a proper witness w), without any restriction over the scheduling of the messages in the different interactions with P . In particular, V * has control over the scheduling of the messages in these interactions. Further, we say that V * is an N -bounded concurrent adversary if it assumes at most N verifier identities during its (unbounded) interactions with P . 7 The transcript of a concurrent interaction consists of the common input x, followed by the sequence of prover and verifier messages exchanged during the interaction. We denote by view P V * (x, z, N ) the random variable describing the content of the random tape of the N -bounded concurrent adversary V * with auxiliary input z and the transcript of the concurrent interaction between P and V * on common input x. Definition 1 (cZK in Bounded Player model) Let P, V be an interactive argument system for a language L. We say that P, V is concurrent zero-knowledge in the Bounded Player model if for every N -bounded concurrent non-uniform ppt adversary V * , there exists a ppt algorithm S, such that the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable, {view
Building Blocks
In this section, we discuss the main building blocks that we will use in our cZK construction.
Perfectly Hiding Commitment Scheme. In our constructions, we will make use of a perfectly hiding string commitment scheme, denoted Com. For simplicity of exposition, we will make the simplifying assumption that Com is a non-interactive perfectly hiding commitment scheme (even though such a scheme cannot exist). In reality, Com would be taken to be a 2-round commitment 7 Thus, V * can open multiple sessions with P for every unique verifier identity.
scheme, which can be based on collections of claw-free permutations [GK96] . Unless stated otherwise, we will simply use the notation Com(x) to denote a commitment to a string x, and assume that the randomness (used to create the commitment) is implicit.
Perfect Witness Indistinguishable Argument of Knowledge. We will also make use of a perfect witness-indistinguishable argument of knowledge system for all of N P in our construction. Such a scheme can be constructed, for example, by parallel repetition of the 3-round Blum's protocol for Graph Hamiltonicity [Blu87] instantiated with a perfectly hiding commitment scheme. We will denote such an argument system by P pWI , V pWI .
Perfect Witness Indistinguishable Universal Argument. In our construction, we will use a perfect witness-indistinguishable universal argument system, denoted P pUA , V pUA . Such an argument system can be constructed generically from a (computational) witness-indistinguishable universal argument pUA by using techniques of [PR05b, PR05a] . Specifically, in protocol P pUA , V pUA , the prover P and verifier V first engage in an execution of pUA, where instead of sending its messages in the clear, P commits to each message using a perfectly hiding commitment scheme. Finally, P and V engage in an execution of a perfect zero knowledge argument of knowledge where P proves that the "decommitted" transcript of pUA is "accepting". The resulting protocol is still a "weak" argument of knowledge.
Perfect (Bounded-Concurrent) Zero-Knowledge. Our cZK argument crucially uses as a building block, a variant of the bounded cZK argument of Barak [Bar01] . Similarly to [PR05a] , we modify the protocol appropriately such that it is perfect bounded cZK. Specifically, instead of a statistically binding commitment scheme, we will use a perfectly hiding commitment scheme. Instead of a computationally witness-indistinguishable universal argument (UARG), we will use a perfect witness indistinguishable UARG, denoted P pUA , V pUA (see Section 2.3). Further, the length parameter (N ) used in the modified protocol is a function of N , where N is the bound on the number of verifiers in the system. Protocol P pB , V pB N is described in Figure 3 and can be based on claw-free permutations.
Resettable Witness Indistinguishable Proof System. We will further use a resettable witnessindistinguishable proof system [CGGM00] for all of N P. Informally speaking, a proof system is resettable witness indistinguishable if it remains witness indistinguishable even against an adversarial verifier who can reset the prover and receive multiple proofs such that the prover uses the same random tape in each of the interactions. While the focus of this work is not on achieving security against reset attacks, such a proof system turns out to be useful when arguing concurrent soundness of our protocol (where our proof relies on a rewinding based argument). We will denote such a proof system by P rWI , V rWI . It follows from [CGGM00] that such a proof system can be based on perfectly hiding commitments.
Dense Cryptosystems [SP92] . We will use a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme, denoted (Gen, Enc, Dec) that supports oblivious key generation (i.e., it should be possible to sample a public key without knowing the corresponding secret key). More precisely, there exists a deterministic algorithm OGen that takes as input the security parameter 1 n and a sufficiently long random string σ and outputs a public key pk ← OGen(1 n , σ), where pk is perfectly indistinguishable from a public key chosen by the normal key generation algorithm Gen. For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that the OGen algorithm simply outputs the input randomness σ as the public key. Such schemes can be based on a variety of number-theoretic assumptions such as DDH [SP92] .
Concurrent Zero Knowledge in Bounded Player Model
In this section, we describe our concurrent zero-knowledge protocol in the bounded player model.
Relation R sim . We first recall a slight variant of Barak's [Bar01] NTIME(T (n)) relation R sim , as used previously in [PR05a] . Let T : N → N be a "nice" function that satisfies T (n) = n ω (1) . Let {H n } n be a family of collision-resistant hash functions where a function h ∈ H n maps {0, 1} * to {0, 1} n , and let Com be a perfectly hiding commitment scheme for strings of length n, where for any α ∈ {0, 1} n , the length of Com(α) is upper bounded by 2n. The relation R sim is described in Figure 2 .
* , a string y ∈ {0, 1} * and a string s ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) . Relation: R sim ( h, c, r , Π, y, s ) = 1 if and only if:
1. |y| ≤ |r| − n.
c = Com(h(Π); s).
3. Π(y) = r within T (n) steps. Figure 2 is slightly oversimplified and will make Barak's protocol work only when {H n } n is collision-resistant against "slightly" super-polynomial sized circuits. For simplicity of exposition, in this manuscript, we will work with this assumption. We stress, however, that as discussed in prior works [BG02, Pas04, PR05b, PR05a] , this assumption can be relaxed by using a "good" error-correcting code ECC (with constant distance and polynomialtime encoding and decoding procedures), and replacing the condition c = Com(h(Π); s) with c = Com(ECC(h(Π)); s).
Remark 1 The relation presented in
Our Protocol
We are now ready to present our concurrent zero knowledge protocol, denoted P, V . Let P and V denote the prover and verifier respectively. Let N denote the bound on the number of verifiers present in the system. Let f owf denote a one-way function, and (Gen, Enc, Dec) denote a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme that supports oblivious key generation. Let P pB , V pB N denote the perfect zero-knowledge proof system as described above. Further, let P pWI , V pWI denote Parameters: Security parameter n, length parameter (N ). Common Input: x ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) . Private Input to P : A witness w such that R L (x, w) = 1.
Stage 1 (Preamble Phase):
V → P : Send h R ← H n . P → V : Send c = Com(0 n ). V → P : Send r R ← {0, 1} (N ) .
Stage 2 (Proof Phase):
P ↔ V : A perfect WI UARG P pUA , V pUA proving the OR of the following statements:
Figure 3: Protocol P pB , V pB N a perfect witness indistinguishable argument of knowledge, and let P rWI , V rWI denote a resettable witness indistinguishable proof system. The protocol P, V is described in Figure 4 . For our purposes, we set the length parameter (N ) = n 3 · N · P (n), where P (n) is a polynomial upper bound on the total length of the prover messages in the protocol plus the length of the secret key of the verifier.
The completeness property of P, V follows immediately from the construction. Due to lack of space, we defer the proof of soundness to Appendix A. We remark that, in fact, we prove concurrent soundness of P, V , i.e., we show that a computationally-bounded adversarial prover who engages in multiple concurrent executions of P, V (where the scheduling across the sessions is controlled by the adversary) cannot prove a false statement in any of the executions, except with negligible probability. We note that similarly to the Bare Public-Key model [CGGM00] , "stand-alone" soundness does not imply concurrent soundness in our model. Informally speaking, this is because the standard approach of reducing concurrent soundness to stand-alone soundness by "internally" emulating all but one verifier does not work since the verifier's secret keys are private. Indeed, Micali and Reyzin [MR01] gave concrete counter-examples to show that standalone soundness does not imply concurrent soundness in the BPK model. We note that their results immediately extend to our model.
We now turn to prove that protocol P, V is concurrent zero-knowledge in the Bounded Player model.
Proof of Zero Knowledge
In this section, we prove that the protocol P, V described in Section 3 is concurrent zero-knowledge in the bounded player model. Towards this end, we will construct a non-black-box (polynomialtime) simulator and then prove that the concurrent adversary's view output by the simulator is indistinguishable from the real view. We start by giving an overview of the proof and then proceed V → P : Send pk = (y 0 , y 1 ).
n and send c p = Com(σ p ).
V ↔ P : An execution of resettable WI P rWI , V rWI to prove the following statement:
Stage 2 (Proof Phase):
P ↔ V : An execution of perfect WIAOK P pWI , V pWI to prove the OR of the following statements: Overview. Barak's argument system [Bar01] is zero-knowledge in the bounded-concurrency model where the concurrent adversary is allowed to open at most m = m(n) concurrent sessions for a fixed polynomial m. Loosely speaking, Barak's simulator takes advantage of the fact that the total number of prover messages across all sessions is bounded; thus it can commit to a machine that takes only a bounded-length input y that is smaller than the challenge string r, and outputs the next message of the verifier, in any session. In our model, there is no bound on the total number of sessions, thus we cannot directly employ the same strategy. Towards this, an important observation in our setting is that once we are able to "solve" a verifier identity (i.e., learn secret key of a verifier), then the simulator does not need to do Barak-style simulation anymore for that identity. But what of the number of Barak-style simulations that the simulator needs to perform before it can learn any secret key? Indeed, if this number were unbounded, then we would run into the same problems that one encounters when trying to construct non-black-box cZK in the standard model. Fortunately, we are able to show that the simulator only needs to perform a bounded number of Barak-style simulations before it can learn a secret key. Thus, we obtain the following strategy: the simulator commits to an "augmented machine" that is able to simulate almost all of the simulator messages by itself; the remaining simulator messages are given as input to this machine. As discussed above, we are able to bound the total number of these messages, and thus by setting the challenge string r to be more than this bound, we ensure that the simulation is correct. More in details, the input passed by the simulator to the machine consists of transcripts of concurrent sessions where again the simulator had to use Barak-style simulation 8 and the (discovered) secret keys of the verifiers to be used by the machine to carry on the simulation by itself (without performing Barak-style simulation).
The Simulator. We now proceed to describe our simulator. The simulator SIM consists of two main parts, namely, SIM easy and SIM extract . Loosely speaking, SIM extract is only used to cheat in a "special" preamble block of a session in order to learn the secret key of a verifier, while SIM easy is used for the remainder of the simulation, which includes following honest prover strategy in preamble blocks and simulating the proof phase of each session using the verifier's secret key as the trapdoor witness. Specifically, SIM extract cheats in the P pB , V pB N protocol by committing to an augmented verifier machine Π that contains the code of SIM easy , allowing it to simulate all of the simulator messages except those generated by SIM extract (in different sessions). As we show below, these messages can be bounded to a fixed value. We now describe the simulator in more detail.
Setup and Inputs. Our simulator SIM interacts with an adversary V * = (V * 1 , . . . , V * N ) who controls verifiers V 1 , . . . , V N . V * interacts with SIM in m sessions, and controls the scheduling of the messages. We give SIM non-black-box access to V * . Throughout the interaction, SIM keeps track of a tuple β = (β 1 , . . . , β N ) representing the secret keys SIM has learned so far. At any point during the interaction either β i = sk i (more precisely, β i is one of the coordinates of sk i ) or β i is the symbol ⊥. Initially, SIM sets each β i to ⊥, but it updates β throughout the interaction as it extracts secret keys. Additionally, SIM keeps a counter a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) , incrementing a i each time it executes a preamble block using SIM extract against V * . We have SIM halt and output FAIL if any a i ever surpasses n 3 . Our technical lemma shows that this happens with negligible probability. Finally, we have SIM keep track of a set of tuples
and φ γ is a string. The tuples (i, j, k) γ represent the preamble blocks played by SIM extract ; specifically, (i, j, k) corresponds to the k−th block of the j−th session against V * . The string φ γ is the collection of simulator messages sent in block (i, j, k) γ . This set of tuples Ψ (along with β) will be the extra input given to the augmented machine. As we show below, the total size of Ψ will be a priori bounded by a polynomial in n.
Consider the interaction of SIM with some V * impersonating V i . Each time V * opens a session on behalf of V i , SIM chooses a random k ∈ {1, . . . , t} according to a distribution D t which we define later. This will be the only preamble block of the session played by SIM extract provided that β i =⊥ when the block begins. If SIM has already learned the secret key sk i , it does not need to call SIM extract . We now describe the parts of SIM beginning with SIM easy .
The sub-simulator SIM easy . Recall that SIM easy is run on input β and Ψ. When SIM easy is called to execute the next message of a preamble block, it checks if the message is already in Ψ. If this is the case, SIM easy just plays the message. Otherwise, SIM easy plays fairly, choosing a 8 The reason we pass this transcript as input is that in this way we can avoid the blow up of the running time of the simulator when nested Barak-style simulations are performed.
random σ p and sending c p = Com(σ p ; s) for some s. Upon receiving σ v , it returns σ p and completes P pB , V pB using s as its witness. Its receipt of encryptions (e 1 , e 2 ) and acceptance of P rWI , V rWI ends the preamble block. If SIM easy does not accept V * 's execution of P rWI , V rWI it aborts the interaction, as would an honest prover.
When SIM easy is called to execute P pWI , V pWI then it checks if the secret key of the verifier is in β. If yes, SIM easy completes P pWI , V pWI using sk i as its witness. Otherwise, β i =⊥ and SIM easy halts outputting FAIL. Our technical lemma shows that the latter does not happen, except with negligible probability.
The sub-simulator SIM extract . When SIM extract is called to execute preamble block k of session j with verifier V * i , it receives Ψ, β and a as input. We assume β i =⊥ since otherwise, SIM would not have called SIM extract . Immediately upon being called, SIM extract increments a i and adds the tuple (i, j, k); φ to Ψ. Initially, φ is the empty string, but each time SIM extract sends a message, it appends the message to φ. By the end of the block, φ is a complete transcript of the simulator messages in preamble block (i, j, k).
The preamble block begins normally, with SIM extract choosing a random string and sending c p , a commitment to it. Upon receiving σ v , however, SIM extract runs Gen obtaining key pair (σ, τ ) for the encryption scheme and returns σ p = σ ⊕ σ v . Next, SIM extract enters P pB , V pB which it completes using the the already extracted secret key. Formally, when V * sends h, beginning P pB , V pB , SIM extract chooses a random s and sends Com h(Π); s , where Π is the next message function of V * , augmented with the ability to compute all the intermediate messages sent by SIM easy . The machine Π takes input y = (Ψ, β) and outputs the next verifier message in an interaction between V * and a machine M who plays exactly like SIM easy with the following exception. For each tuple (i, j, k); φ ∈ Ψ, M reads its messages of block (i, j, k) from the string y. In order to simulate SIM easy in the subprotocols P pWI , V pWI , M also uses the tuple β = (β 1 , . . . , β N ) received as input, where each β i is the secret key of the i -th verifier (if available), and ⊥ otherwise. After committing to Π, and receiving r, SIM extract completes P pUA , V pUA using witness (Π, Ψ β, s) where Ψ and β might have been updated by other executions of SIM extract occurring between the time SIM extract sent Com h(Π); s and received r. Our counter ensures that |Ψ| is a priori bounded, while |β| is bounded by definition. By construction, Π correctly predicts V * 's message r, and so (Π, Ψ β, s) is a valid witness for P sUA , V sUA . Finally, SIM extract receives encryptions e 1 , e 2 and the proof of correctness in P rWI , V rWI . It now decrypts the ciphertexts using τ thereby learning secret key sk i of V * i . If the decrypted value is a valid secret key sk i , then it updates β by setting β i = sk i . Otherwise, it outputs the abort symbol ⊥ and stops. (It is easy to see that since the proof system P rWI , V rWI is sound, the probability of simulator outputting ⊥ at this step is negligible.)
Analysis. There are two situations in which SIM outputs fail: if some counter a i exceeds n 3 , or if SIM easy enters an execution P pWI , V pWI without knowledge of sk. Note that the latter will not happen, as to enter an execution of P pWI , V pWI , all preamble blocks, in particular the one played by SIM extract , must be complete, ensuring that SIM extract will have learned sk. In our main technical lemma, we show that no counter will surpass n 3 by proving that after SIM has run SIM extract n 3 times against each V i controlled by V * it has, with overwhelming probability, learned sk. Before stating the lemma, we introduce some terminology. Now, focusing on a given verifier, we say that V * has stopped session j in block k if the k−th preamble block of session j has begun, but the (k + 1)−th has not. We say that V * is playing strategy k = (k 1 , . . . , k m ) if session j is stopped in block k j for all j = 1, . . . , m. As the interaction takes polynomial time, V * only gets to play polynomially many strategies over the course of the interaction. Let k j ∈ {1, . . . , t} be the random number chosen by SIM at the beginning of session j as per distribution D t . This gives us a tuple k = (k 1 , . . . , k m ) where the k j are chosen independently according to the distribution D t (defined below). At any time during the interaction, we say that V * has won (resp. lost, tied) session j if k j = k j (resp. k j > k j , k j < k j ). A win for V * corresponds to SIM having run SIM extract , but not yet having learned sk. As SIM only gets to call SIM extract n 3 times, a win for V * means that SIM has used up one of its budget of n 3 without any payoff. A loss for V * corresponds to SIM running SIM extract and learning sk, thereby allowing SIM to call SIM easy in all remaining sessions. A tie means that SIM has not yet called SIM extract in the session, and therefore has not used any of its budget, but has not learned sk.
Notice that these wins and ties are "temporary" events. Indeed, by the end of each session, V * will have lost, as he will have completed the preamble block run by SIM extract . However, we choose to use this terminology to better convey the key intuition of our analysis: for SIM to output FAIL, it must be that at some point during the interaction, for some identity, V * has won at least n 3 sessions and has not lost any. We will therefore focus precisely on proving that the probability that a PPT adversary V * runs in the experiment m sessions so that the counter for one identity reaches the value n 3 is negligible.
For a verifier strategy k and a polynomial m, let P ( k ,m) (W, L) be the probability that in an m−session interaction between V * and SIM that V * wins for some identity exactly W sessions and loses exactly L, given that V * plays strategy k . The probability is over SIM 's choice of k with k j ∈ {1, . . . , t} chosen independently according to D t (defined below) for all j = 1, . . . , m.
The Distribution D t and the Main Technical Lemma. Define D t to be the distribution on {1, . . . , t} such that
where ε is such that p k = 1. Note that ε is negligible in n.
Lemma 1 (Main Technical Lemma) Let k be a verifier strategy and m = m(n) a polynomial. Then we have
is negligible in n.
The above proves that any verifier strategy has a negligible chance of having n 3 wins and no losses.
As V * plays polynomially many (i.e., N ) strategies throughout the course of the interaction, the union bound proves that V * has a negligible chance of ever achieving n 3 wins and 0 losses. From this it follows that, with overwhelming probability, V * will never have at least n 3 wins and no losses, which implies that SIM outputs FAIL with negligible probability as desired.
Proof . We fix a verifier strategy k and a polynomial m and write
. Let p k (resp. q k ) be the probability that V * wins (resp. loses) a session given that he stops the session in block k . We chose the distribution D t carefully to have the following two properties. First, since p 1 = εn is negligible, we may assume that V * never stops in the first block of a session. And secondly, for k ≥ 2 we have,
It follows that no matter which what block V * stops a session in, it will hold that the probability he wins in that session is less then 2n times the probability that he looses that session. We will use this upper bound on the probability of V * winning a single session to show that P (n 3 , 0) is negligible.
Let A be the event, (W, L) = (n 3 , 0), B be the event W + L = n 3 and ¬B the event W + L = n 3 . Since, A ⊂ B, and since P (A|¬B) = 0, we have that P (n 3 , 0) = P (A) = P (A|B)P (B) + P (A|¬B)P (¬B) = P (A|B)P (B) ≤ P (A|B), and so it suffices to prove that P (A|B) is negligible. We continue the proof for the case W + L = n 3 (and thus m ≥ n 3 ).
If W + L = n 3 then V * ties all but n 3 of the sessions. Let
Then C is the set of possible positions for the sessions which are not ties. We are looking to bound P (W, L) = (n 3 , 0) W + L = n 3 and so we condition on the C ∈ C. Once a fixed C is chosen, the position of each session which is not a tie is determined. Each such session must either be a win or a loss for V * . Let p be the probability that some such session is a win. Since we proved already that the probability that V * wins in a given session is less then 2n times the probability that V * looses in that session, we have that
. It follows that for any C ∈ C, the probability that all sessions in C are wins is
We therefore have
as desired.
Bounding the length parameter (N ). From the above lemma, it follows easily that the total length of the auxiliary input y to the machine Π committed by SIM extract (at any time) is bounded by n 3 · N · P (n), where P (n) is a polynomial upper bound on the total length of prover messages in one protocol session plus the length of a secret. Thus, when (N ) ≥ n 3 · N · P (n), we have that |y| ≤ |r| − n, as required.
Indistinguishability of views. Now that we have described our simulator, we show through a sequence of hybrid experiments that its output is indistinguishable from the output of the adversary when interacting with honest provers. Our hybrid experiments will be H i for i = 0, . . . , 7. We write H i ≈ H j if V * cannot distinguish between its interaction with H i and H j . H 0 . The experiment H 0 is the fair prover. In each preamble block it sends c p = Com(σ p ; s) for random σ p , receives σ v and returns σ p . It completes P pB , V pB using s as its witness. It receives the encryptions and V * 's proof of P rWI , V rWI completing the preamble block. We provide H 0 with a witness that x ∈ L which it uses to complete P pWI , V pWI at the end of each session.
The experiment H 1 plays similarly to H 0 . However, the execution of H 1 takes exponential time. It begins by computing the verifier secret keys by inverting the one-way functions in exponential time. It will use knowledge of secret key in the protocols P pWI , V pWI . The perfect witness indistinguishability of P pWI , V pWI ensures that H 1 ≈ H 0 .
The experiment H 2 plays similarly to H 1 . However P pB , V pB is run by using the witness for x ∈ L. The perfect witness indistinguishability of P pB , V pB ensures that H 2 ≈ H 1 . H 3 . The experiment H 3 plays similarly to H 2 . However, there is an update in all the preamble blocks where the simulator would have tried to extract by playing a fake σ p . The update consists in running Gen therefore obtaining key pair (σ, τ ) for the encryption scheme, and then in sending σ p = σ ⊕ σ v . By the fact that the public key of dense secure cryptosystem has the uniform distribution, we have that H 3 ≈ H 2 . H 4 . The experiment H 4 plays similarly to H 3 . The only difference is that in all the preamble blocks where the simulator would have tried to extract, and where the adversary plays the resettable witness indistinguishable proof, if the extracted strings (obtained by decrypting the two encryptions) do not give a secret key then the experiment aborts. If the experiment does not abort, then it continues by using the extracted secret key instead of the one obtained by running in exponential time.
The unconditional soundness of the resettable witness indistinguishable proof guarantees that the above abort can happen only with negligible probability, therefore correct secret keys are extracted during this experiment and can be used after the extraction. Therefore H 4 ≈ H 3 . H 5 . The experiment H 5 plays similarly to H 4 . The only difference is that in all the preamble blocks where the simulator would have tried to extract, in its first message of P pB , V pB , we commit to the augmented machine Π. As before, the augmented machine Π predicts the next message of V * and is able to simulate all fair messages of H 5 . It therefore must take as input only the prover messages of the preamble blocks where H 5 does not play fairly. We have H 5 keep track of a set of tuples Ψ = (i, j, k) γ ; y γ : γ = 1, . . . , n 3 N , where the tuple (i, j, k); y means that in the k−th preamble block of the j−th session against V * i , H 5 sent messages y. Π also receives a tuple β = (β 1 , . . . , β N ) where β i could correspond to a secret key of the i-th verifier and to ⊥ otherwise. The simulated prover will use them in P pWI , V pWI different than ⊥. As the only difference between the output of H 5 and H 4 is that sometimes H 5 commits to a different value than H 4 does, the perfect hiding of Com ensures that H 5 ≈ H 4 . H 6 . The experiment H 6 plays similarly to H 5 . The only difference is that in P pB , V pB no witness for x ∈ L is used, but instead the simulator of P pB , V pB is run by using in the underlying P pUA , V pUA values (Π, Ψ, β, s) where Π is the augmented machine committed in the chosen execution of P pB , V pB , Ψ is the record of all messages sent in the chosen preamble blocks where it deviates from fair play, β is the vector of known keys, and s is the witness to be used in the non-chosen execution of P pB , V pB . The reason that |Ψ| can be a priori bounded by a polynomial in n is that by the main technical lemma, we have that Π needs messages for at most n 3 N chosen preamble blocks where H 6 deviates from fair play. The perfect witness indistinguishability of P pUA , V pUA ensures that H 6 ≈ H 5 .
H 7 . This is our simulator. We no longer give it a witness that x ∈ L, and we no longer allow it to run in exponential time, so it obtains sk i only through decryptions. Again, by the main technical lemma, the probability that H 7 successfully learns each sk i before is needed is overwhelming. Our technical lemma shows that H 7 will not output FAIL except with negligible probability. Therefore we have that H 7 ≈ H 6 .
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Appendix
A Proof of Soundness
In this section, we prove the soundness of our cZK protocol described in Section 3. In fact, we will prove concurrent soundness of P, V , i.e., we will show that a computationally-bounded adversarial prover who engages in multiple concurrent executions of P, V (where the scheduling across the sessions is controlled by the adversary) cannot prove a false statement in any of the executions, except with negligible probability. We note that similar to the bare-public key model [CGGM00] , "stand-alone" soundness does not imply concurrent soundness in our model. Informally speaking, this is because the standard approach of reducing concurrent soundness to stand-alone soundness by "internally" emulating all but one verifier does not work since the verifier's secret keys are private. Indeed, Micali and Reyzin [MR01] gave concrete counter-examples to show that standalone soundness does not imply concurrent soundness in the bare public key model. We note that their results immediately extend to our model.
We now proceed to formally prove the concurrent soundness of our protocol P, V . We claim the following theorem. Figure 4 is concurrently sound.
Theorem 2 The protocol P, V presented in
Proof of Theorem 2. We first introduce some notation. Recall that in our protocol, in the execution of P pWI , V pWI , the prover proves the OR of two statements. We will call a witness corresponding to the first (resp., second) part of the statement as true (resp., trapdoor) witness.
We first state a basic lemma related to the soundness of each instance of P pB , V pB N across all executions of P, V . Its proof is essentially identical to [Bar01] , hence below we only discuss a proof sketch, using the terminology of [DGS09] .
Lemma 2 LetP be any non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time adversarial prover that engages in any polynomial m = m(n) number of concurrent executions of P, V with N honest verifiers.
Then, every instance of P pB , V pB N across all executions of P, V is sound.
Proof (Sketch). Let us assume the contrapositive, i.e., with non-negligible probability , there exists at least one pair (i, k) such thatP successfully convinces the verifier of a false statement in the k th instance (out of t = ω(1) instances) of P pB , V pB N in session i. Let S denote the set of all such pairs (i, k) and let v = |S|. Now consider any pair (i * , k * ) ∈ S. Letx denote the statement proved byP in P pB , V pB i * ,k * N . We have that with probability at least /v,x is false. In this case, we will construct a superpolynomial time machine M that finds collisions for the hash function. 9 Without loss of generality, assume thatP is deterministic. Consider the transcript of messages (across all sessions) that occur beforeP sends the second protocol message in P pB , V pB i * ,k * N . Note that this transcript, in particular, includes the hash function h that the verifier sends toP as the first message of P pB , V pB i * ,k * N . We will call this transcript as the prefix for the rest of the protocol. Let = /v. Now it must be the case that for at least /2 fraction of the prefixes, the probability (over the rest of the verifier coins) that the adversarial proverP will succeed in P pB , V pB i * ,k * N is at least /2. We will call this set of prefixes to be good. The machine M works as follows. It first runsP and invokes the weak knowledge extractor E for the universal argument system P pUA , V pUA . The probability (over all verifier random coins) of the prefix being good and E succeeding (given that prefix is good) is at least 2 · p( 2 ), where p is a polynomial 10 . Now, if E succeeds and extracts a program, say Π, M rewindsP up to the point where it sent the second message in P pB , V pB i * ,k * N and continues with fresh random coins; in particular, it chooses a fresh random string r
It then runs the extractor E again and if it succeeds, M obtains another program Π . By a simple counting argument, it follows immediately that if S Π is the set of all possible outputs of Π, then r ∈ S Π with only negligible probability. Thus, we have that Π = Π . However, since h(Π) = h(Π ) (this follows from the computational binding property of Com), we have found collisions Π, Π for h. The probability of finding collision can be computed as:
It follows that the probability of this event is noticeable in n, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Completing the Proof of Theorem 2. Let us assume the contrapositive, i.e., assume that P, V is not concurrently sound. Then, with non-negligible probability , there exists an i such thatP succeeds in proving a false statement to the verifier in session i. Let S denote the set of all such i and let v = |S|. Now, consider any i ∈ S. Note that it immediately follows from the (stand-alone) soundness of P pWI , V pWI that with probability at least v − negl(n),P use a trapdoor witness in P pWI , V pWI in session i. LetṼ denote the verifier in session i and let pk = (y 0 , y 1 ) denote the public key ofṼ . Now, we runP such that in all protocol executions involving verifierṼ , we only use the secret key x b corresponding to y b , where b R ← {0, 1}. We now invoke the knowledge extractor E for P pWI , V pWI onP in session i. It follows from a standard argument (based on using "good" prefixes) that E successfully extracts a trapdoor witness with probability p = p( ) where p is some polynomial. We now consider two cases:
1. With probability α, E outputs a witnessx 1−b such that y 1−b = f owf (x 1−b ).
With probability p − α, E outputs a witnessx
If α is non-negligible (in n), then it is immediate to see that we can build a polynomial-time inverter for one-way function f owf . Specifically, the inverter I for f owf works as follows. It runs the entire experiment withP in the same manner as above, except that y 1−b is taken from an external challenger for f owf . When E outputs a valuex 1−b , I outputs it as the pre-image of y 1−b w.r.t. f owf . Note that I succeeds with non-negligible probability α, which is a contradiction.
On the other hand, if α is negligible (in n), then we now focus on the second case. Letm denote the total number of protocol sessions of P, V involving verifierṼ . Then, we have that with probability p − negl(n), whenṼ (only) uses the secret key x 0 in allm protocol sessions, the extractor E outputs a valuex 0 , and similarly, whenṼ (only) uses x 1 , E outputs a valuex 1 , wherê x b is such that f owf (x b ) = y b . Then, by a standard hybrid argument, there exists a session j (out of them sessions involvingṼ ) such that whenṼ (only) uses the secret key x 0 (resp., x 1 ) in session j, the extractor E outputs a valuex 0 (resp.,x 1 ), with probability at least p = p−negl(n) m
. 11 Let H 0 (resp., H 1 ) denote the hybrid experiment whereṼ uses x 0 (resp., x 1 ) in session j. Letx b be the random variable that denotes the value that E extracts fromP in experiment H b .
We will now argue thatx 0 c ≡x 1 , except with negligible probability, which is a contradiction to the above hypothesis, and thus concludes our proof. 2 ), then the witness used in P pWI , V pWI must be information-theoretically independent of the value encrypted in e q+1 1 , which gives us a contradiction. Therefore, we now only consider the case where the execution of P pWI , V pWI in session i concludes afterP receives (e q+1 1 , e q+1 2 ). In this case, we will construct a polynomial-time machine M that breaks the semantic security of the encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec).
M works in the same manner as hybrid H 0:q , except that it also interacts with an external challenger C (for the encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec)) in the following manner. M receives a public key σ from C and then "forces" it to be the outcome of the (q + 1) th coin-tossing subprotocol in session j. Specifically, after receiving the value σ p fromP in the (q+1) th coin-tossing subprotocol, M rewindsP and sends a value σ v = σ ⊕ σ p . It now sends x 0 , x 1 to C and receives a challenge ciphertext e * . M continues in the same manner as H 0:q , except that it prepares e q+1 1 = e * . Now, note that if e * is an encryption of x 0 , then this machine is identical to H 0:q , otherwise it is identical to H 0:q+1 . M now invokes the knowledge extractor E onP in P pWI , V pWI in session i. Note that the sessions i and j may be interleaved in such a manner that when E rewindsP to send a new "challenge" in P pWI , V pWI , either of the following two events happen:
1.P sends a new commitment string c = Com(σ p ) in the (q + 1) th coin-tossing subprotocol in session j. In this case, M simply continues session j honestly until it receives σ p . At this point, it rewindsP again to send a value σ v = σ ⊕ σ p and then continues honestly.
2. Alternatively,P may simply send a new value σ p and then proceed to prove its correctness in the execution of P pB , V pB j,q+1 N . If this is the case, then M simply aborts.
11 Here, the hybrids are such thatṼ uses x0 in all session j < j, and x1 in all sessions j > j. In this case, we will construct a polynomial-time machine M that breaks the resettable witness indistinguishability property of P rWI , V rWI . M works in the same manner as hybrid H enc 1 :q , except that it forwards the (q + 1) th instance of P rWI , V rWI in session j, i.e., P rWI , V rWI q+1 , to an external prover P (for the resettable-WI protocol P rWI , V rWI ) in the following manner. M first gives w 1 , w 2 to P , where w 1 is the witness corresponding to e q+1 1 , and similarly, w 2 is the witness corresponding to e q+1 2 . Now, during the execution of P rWI , V rWI q+1 , M simply forwards each message msg P from P toP and similarly forwards each response msgP fromP to P . It then runs the knowledge extractor E onP in P pWI , V pWI in session i to extract a value, sayx. Note that if sessions i and j are scheduled such that when E rewindsP in P pWI , V pWI in session i, P sends a new l th round-message msg P in P rWI , V rWI q+1 , then M resets P to the point where its supposed to receive the l th round message and sends msg P . It then continues the execution in the same manner as described above. When E finally outputsx, then M finds b such that f owf (x) = y b and outputs b to P . It follows easily that M succeeds with noticeable (in n) advantage, which is a contradiction.
Hybrid H enc 2 : This is the same as H enc 2 , except thatṼ prepares each ciphertext e q 2 to be an encryption of x 1 . We now run the extractor E onP in experiment H enc 2 . Letx enc 2 be the random variable that denotes the value that E outputs. For the same reasons as argued above (for Hybrid H enc 1 ), it follows thatx wi c ≡x enc 2 . This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
B Concurrent Self-Composition in the Bounded Player Model
In this section, we present the definition for concurrent (self-composition) secure multi-party computation in the bounded player model. The definition we give below is an adaptation of the definition of concurrent secure computation with adaptive inputs [Lin04, Pas04] , to the setting of bounded player model. Parts of the definition below have been taken almost verbatim from [Lin04, Pas04] .
adaptively. The only limitation is that for any s, at most one pair indexed by s can be sent to the trusted party on behalf of P i . ). It then computes f ( x s ) and sends (s, f i ( x s )) to party P i for every i ∈ I s , where I s ⊆ I denotes the set of corrupted parties in session s. Note that I s must be such that |I s | < n.
Trusted party answers corrupted parties:
Adversary instructs the trusted party to answer honest parties: When the adversary sends a message of the type (send-output, s, i ) to the trusted party, the trusted party sends (s, f i ( x s )) to party P i .
Outputs: Each honest party P i always outputs the values f i ( x s ) that it obtained from the trusted party. The adversary may output an arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its initial-input and the messages obtained from the trusted party.
Let S be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine (representing the ideal-model adversary). Then, the ideal execution of f with security parameter n, input selecting machines M = M 1 , . . . , M N , initial inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) and auxiliary input z to S, denoted ideal N f,I,S,M (n, x, z), is defined as the output vector of the honest parties and S from the above ideal execution.
Real model. We next consider the real model in which a real two-party protocol is executed (and there exists no trusted third party). Let f , I, N be as above and let Π be a multi-party protocol for computing f . Let A denote the adversary. Then, the real concurrent execution of Π with security parameter n, input selecting machines M = M 1 , . . . , M N , initial inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) and auxiliary input z to A, denoted real N Π,I,A,M (n, x, z), is defined as the output vector of the honest parties and A, resulting from the following real-world process. The real world execution proceeds as follows. Each honest party P i first chooses an identity id i and registers it with F N bp . A corrupted party may choose to register its identity at any time it wishes, even after the computation begins. An honest party initiates a new session whenever it receives a start-session message from A. It then applies its input selecting machine to its initial input, the session number and its previously received outputs, and obtains the input for this session. Note that arbitrary (possibly intersecting) sets of n (out of N ) player may be participating in concurrent executions of Π. The scheduling of all messages throughout the executions is controlled by the adversary. That is, the execution proceeds as follows. The adversary sends a message of the form (s, msg, P i , P j ) to an honest party P i on behalf of a corrupted party P j . If that honest party is participating in session s, and this is the first message it has received from P j , then it first retrieves the identity id j of P j from F N bp . It then adds (msg, P i , P j ) to its view of session s and replies according to the instructions of Π and this view.
Security Definition. Having defined the ideal and real models of computation, we are now ready to give our formal security definition. 
C Impossibility Results in Bounded Player Model
In [Lin04], Lindell gave broad impossibility results for unbounded concurrent self-composition in the standard model. We observe that the impossibility result of [Lin04] carries over in a straightforward manner to bounded player model considered in the present work. Below, in what is largely an informal discussion, we elaborate on this observation. [Lin04, Lin03b, CKL06, KL11] Lindell's impossibility result [Lin04] for unbounded concurrent self-composition in the standard model is obtained by combining three different results. Below, we will recall all of these results and discuss how each of them carry over to the bounded player model. First, we recall some basic definitions from [Lin04] . A large part of text below is taken verbatim from [Lin04] .
Security under concurrent general composition. Informally speaking, concurrent general composition considers the case that a protocol ρ for securely computing some functionality f , is run concurrently (many times) with arbitrary other protocols π. In other words, the secure protocol ρ is run many times in a network in which arbitrary activity takes place. (Note that in contrast, in concurrent self-composition, we only consider security for concurrent executions of the same protocol ρ.) The formalize security in this setting, we model the arbitrary network activity π as a "calling protocol" with respect to the functionality f f. That is, π is a protocol that contains, among other things, "ideal calls" to a trusted party that computes a functionality f . This means that in addition to standard messages sent between the parties, protocol π's specification contains instructions of the type "send the value x to the trusted party and receive back output y". Then, the real-world scenario is obtained by replacing the ideal calls to f in protocol π with real executions of protocol ρ. The composed protocol is denoted π ρ and it takes place without any trusted help. Security is defined by requiring that for every protocol π that contains ideal calls to f , an adversary interacting with the composed protocol π ρ (where there is no trusted help) can do no more harm than in an execution of π where a trusted party computes all the calls to f . This therefore means that ρ behaves just like an ideal call to f , even when it is run concurrently with any arbitrary protocol π. We refer the reader to [Lin04] for a formal security definition.
Concurrent general composition in the bounded player model. We note that security under concurrent general composition can be naturally defined in the bounded player model by considering an a-priori bound on the total number of player in the system, in the same manner as in Definition 2. More specifically, we will consider an a-priori bound N on the total number of player in the system. Then, arbitrary (possibly intersecting) subsets of parties may be involved in unbounded concurrent executions of ρ, in the presence of arbitrary other protocols π. (Note that π can be at-most an N -party protocol.) Security is defined in the same manner as above.
Functionalities that enable bit transmission. Informally speaking, a functionality enables bit transmission if it can be used by the parties to send bits to each other. We now recall the formal definition from [Lin04] .
Definition 3 (Bit-transmitting functionality) A deterministic functionality f = (f 1 , f 2 ) enables bit transmission from P 1 to P 2 if there exists an input y for P 2 and a pair of inputs x, x for P 1 such that f 2 (x; y) = f 2 (x ; y). Likewise, f enables bit transmission from P 2 to P 1 if there exists an input x for P 1 and a pair of inputs y, y for P 2 such that f 1 (x; y) = f 1 (x; y ). A functionality enables bit transmission if it enables bit transmission from P 1 to P 2 and from P 2 to P 1 .
The above definition can be easily generalized to probabilistic functionalities, as well as to multiparty functionalities in a straightforward way. We refer the reader to [Lin04] for more details. Extending Lindell's impossibility result to bounded player model. We now consider the three steps involved in the impossibility result in [Lin04] , and briefly discuss why they carry over to the bounded player model.
Step 1: First, it is shown in [Lin04] that for every functionality f that enables bit transmission, security under unbounded concurrent self-composition is equivalent to security under concurrent general composition. That is, if f enables bit transmission, then f can be securely computed unbounded concurrent self-composition if and only if it can be securely computed under concurrent general composition.
We note that [Lin04] proves this (unconditional) result for two-party setting where only one set of parties run all of the protocol executions. As such, the result already works in the bounded player model.
Step 2: Next, we use the result of [Lin03b] , where it is shown that security under concurrent general composition implies security in the universal composability framework [Can01] . This result is also unconditional, and in fact, also works in a setup model (such as a common reference string, etc).
Once again, we note that [Lin04] obtains this result even for the restrictive case where only one set of parties engage in two-party protocol executions (the adversary is assumed to be static). As such, this result is also applicable to the bounded player model.
Step 3: Finally, one can use the result of Canetti et al. [CKL06] that shows a large class of functionalities for which UC security cannot be achieved. With respect to the bounded player model, we note that very recently, Kidron and Lindell [KL11] show that the results of [CKL06] can be extend to the bulletin-board certificate authority model, which is formalized in essentially the same manner as our bounded player model, in that the parties register their unique identities to a functionality. We note that the result in [KL11] already works when the number of parties are a-priori bounded, as such it is applicable to our setting.
Combining these three steps, we can obtain broad impossibility results for concurrent selfcomposition in the bounded player model. In order to obtain the formal statement, let us first recall the class of functionalities Ψ for which concurrent general composition is shown to be impossible [Lin03b] . The following is taken verbatim from [Lin04, Lin03b] .
